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The Hippocratic Oath 
I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius anq H ygeia and Panacea and 
all the gods and goddesses, making them m y witnesses , that I will fulfill 
according to my ability and judgment this oath and this cove nant: 
. To hold him who has taught me this art as eq ual to m y parents and to 
h~e my life in partnership with him , and if he is in need of money to givf> 
hJm a share of min e,. and to regard his offspring as eq ual to m y brothers in 
male lineage and to teach them this art- if they desire to learn it - without 
fee and covenant; to give a share of precepts and oral instruction a nd all the 
other learning to m y sons and to the so ns of him who has instructed me and 
to pupils who have signed the covenant and ha ve tak e n an oath according to 
the m edical law, but to no one else . 
.I. will apply di etetic m eas ures for the benefit of the sic k according to my 
ab1hty and judgment; I will keep them fro m harm and injustice. 
I will neith er give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it , nor will I 
make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman an 
abortive remedy . In purity and holiness I will guard m y life and my art. 
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I will not use the knife, not even on sufferers from stone, but will 
withdraw in favor of such men as are engaged in this work . 
Whatever house I may visit, I will come for the benefit of the sick , 
remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all mischief and in particular o f 
sexual relations with both female and male persons, be they free or slaves. 
Whatever I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside 
of the treatment'in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must 
spread abroad, I will keep to myself holding such things shameful to be 
spoken about. 
If I fulfill this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to me to enjoy 
life and art, being honored with fame among all men for all time to come ; if 
I transgress it and swear falsely, may the opposite of all this be my lot. 1 
The Oath According to Hippocrates 
In So Far as a Christian May Swear It 
Blessed be God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Who is blessed for 
ever and ever; I lie not. 
I will bring no stain upon the learning of the medical art. Neither will I 
give poison to anybody though asked to do so, nor will I suggest such a 
plan. Similarly I will not give treatment to women to cause abortion, treat 
ment neither from above nor from below. But I will teach thilil art, to thosP 
who require to learn it, without grudging and without an indenture. I will 
use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment. And ir 
purity and in holiness I will guard my art. Info whatsoever houses I enter, 1 
will do so to help the sick , keepirig free from all wrongdoing, intentional or 
unintentional, tending to death or to injury, and from fornication with 
bond or free, man or woman. Whats.oever in the course of practice I see or 
hear (or outside my practice in social intercourse) that ought not to be 
published abroad, I will not divulge, but consider such things to be holy 
secrets. Now if I keep this oath and break it not, may God be my helper in 
my life and art, and may I be honoured among all men for all time. If I keep 
faith , well; but if I forswear myself may the opposite befall me. 2 
The Hippocratic Oath is the most familiar of that long line of oaths, 
prayers, and codes by which doctors have transmitted an ethos to 
members of their profession. Indeed, it is sometimes simply called 
"the doctor's oath." In our age, however, enamored of novelty and 
confident of its technological powers, familiarity seems to have bred, 
if not contempt, 3 at least the sort of quaint regard which relegates 
ancient documents to the historian's museum of curiosities. It is my 
intention, nevertheless, to suggest that there are lessons to be learned 
- or relearned - from this oath and its history, lessons which can be 
instructive concerning a professional ethic for physicians and the pos-
sible contributions of theology to that ethic. 
The intention ought not be misunderstood. I will not suggest that 
the Hippocratic Oath is an adequate and comprehensive foundat ion 
for a professional ethic today. I will not call upon doctors and moral-
ists concerned with medical ethics to swear it again. I will not deny 
that the invocation of Apollo, Asclepius, Hygeia, Panacea, and all the 
gods and godd~sses sounds quaint to modern ears or claim that such 
an invocation can be made with Christian integrity. I will not denY 
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that the ~ncient ins~i~utions presupposed in the oath for the learning 
and prac~Ice of medicme differ from their contemporary counterparts. 
~nd ! Will not recommend the stipulations of the oath as a code to 
Simpl_Ify the address to the dilemmas and quandaries posed by medical 
practice. 
That list of disclaimers, it may easily be observed, involves every 
part of the oath. It may prompt the question of what is to be salvaged. 
But the lessons to be gleCJ.ned from this ancient document are not to 
be f?und in its content so much as in certain features of its history 
and Its method. I want to suggest that there are lessons to be learned 
(1) from its reformist intention; (2) from its treatment of medicine as 
a practice with intrinsic goods and standards; and ( 3) from setting 
these standards in a context which expressed and evoked an identity 
and recognized one 's dependence upon and indebtedness to a com-
munit~ and to the transcendent. Finally, I want to suggest (4) that 
t?ere IS a lesson for Christians who would contribute to the discus-
SIOns of bioethics in the early Church's adoption and revision of the 
doctor's oath. In an age when medicine's powers flourish, but its ethos 
flou?ders, the ancient oath may help us to attend to ways of doing 
mediCal ethics which are not currently popular. I undertake, therefore 
both to describe certain features of the ancient oath and to defend 
the~ as having some promise for the contemporary consideration of 
~ed1eal ethics in comparison to certain features of the current 
hterature. 
~ccording to Ludwig Edelstein, interpreter of the oath, the Hippo-
cratic Oath was not formulated by the great Hippocrates himself but 
·by a small group of Pythagorean physicians late in the fourth cen'tury 
B.C. Edelstein observes that the oath was a minority opinion, "a 
Pythagorean manifesto," written against the stream and intending 
the reform of medicine 4 
~or centuries before the oath, ancient physicians had provided 
P_oison for those whom they could not heal, had counted abortifa-
Cients among the tools of their trade, and had been disposed to the use 
of the knife instead of the less invasive use of dietetics and pharma-
c~logy. Moreover, they had sometimes been guilty of injustice and 
nuschief toward their patients, and sometimes quite shamelessly 
broken confidences . · 
. When the little sect of Pythagoreans set out to reform the condi-
~~~n of ~e?icine, they ~ound no help in the law , which forbade 
either _smc1de nor abortiOn. They could plainly find no help in the 
conventiOnal behavior of physicians in antiquity. Nor did they find 
help in any " philosophical consensus ," for , insofar as there was any 
~eement about these issues, it worked against the Pythagorean posi-
tion . Platonists , Cynics, and Stoics could honor suicide as a coura-
geous triumph over fate. Aristotelians and Epicureans were much 
lllore circumspect, but they did not forbid suicide. And abortion was 
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typically considered essential for a well-ordered state. The argume1 s 
between Pythagoreans and other Greek philosophers must ha e 
seemed as interminable and as conceptually incommensurable as a y 
contemporary moral argument. The minority status of their opinio . s, 
however, did not dissuade the Pythagoreans. 
The point is not to defend the oath's absolute prohibitions of a b ·r-
tion and euthanasia and surely not to defend Pythagorean philosoJ ty · 
or the premises it might supply to defend such prohibitions. 5 r; 1e 
point is rather to call attention to this feature of the oath 's met! >d 
and history, that in spite of their minority position, the conviction ~ of 
this community led them and moved them to reform. They refuse( to 
be satisfied with the medicine they saw around them. They refuse( to 
reduce medical morality to what the law allowed or what some ph lo-
sophical consensus determined. They intended the reform of medic 1e. 
Investigate, Articulate an Ethic 
The lesson, I suggest, for the contemporary discussions of me cal 
ethics is that some, at least, should take courage to investigate nd 
articulate a medical ethic which may stand at some remove f ') ffi 
conventional behavior and attitudes within the profession and w i ich 
may be based on convictions and standards more particular and •re-
found than legal and contractual obligations or some. minimal pi ilo-
sophical consensus. Communities with convictions about what hu r an 
persons are meant to be and to become, with visions of what it m . ·ans 
for embodied persons to flourish and thrive, have an opportunity and 
vocation to think through the art of medicine from their own perspec-
tives. 
The recent literature on medical ethics has not owned such an 
agenda. Indeed, the moral convictions and visions of particular com-
munities typically have been tolerated and trivialized in the litera ture. 
On the one hand, there is an insistence that everyone 's moral poin t of 1 
view should be respected. On the other hand, there has been an insis-
tence that the only arguments which may count publicly are those 
which can be made independently of a distinctive moral point of view . . 
This simultaneous tolerance and trivialization is accomplished by 
making the autonomy of the agent the highest human good, by mak-
ing contracts between such autonomous agents the model of hu man 
relationships, and by focusing almost exclusively on the proced ural 
question of who should decide. G The ancient enterprise of attempting 
"public" goo~, for then it threatens to restrict and subvert autonomy. 
S_uch recent literature on medical ethics has provided - and can pro-
VIde - o?l~ a "thin theory of the good," 7 only a shriveled and danger-
ously mimmal construal of the moral life in its medical dimensions. 
We find,_ in_ much contemporary medical ethics, for example, a readi-
ness to Insist on procedures to protect autonomy but a reticence to 
provide . an~ advice ab?ut the morally proper uses of that autonomy 
and a dismissal of the Idea that physicians should be the ones to give 
such advice. · · 
The Hippocratic Oath, however, can remind us that the current 
focus on autonomy and contracts and procedural questions provides 
only a minimal account of medical morality. It can encourage us to 
own a fuller vision of medical morality and to seek the reform of 
medicine in the light of that vision . 
The Pythagoreans' reform movement finally triumphed. The oath 
~adu~lly moved from the status of a counter-cultural manifesto to a 
histone do_cument which formed and informed the ethos of physicians 
for ~entun_es . The explanation for this trimph was not any philo-
sophiCal tn~mph by the Pythagoreans; their influence, never great, 
Wane~i. Their reform, however, articulated not just Pythagorean moral 
~remises and conclusions, but standards inherent in medicine when it 
Is seen as a practice with certain intrinsic goods . They situated these 
stand~ds in a context which provided and formed identity and which 
recognized dependence and indebtedness to a community and to the 
t~nsc~ndent. These standards finally won the support of another 
mmonty community, a community which did move to dominance in 
·Western culture - the Christian Church. These features of the oath 
ex_plai~ its triumph. They are still instructive and, after more than two 
rnill~ma, again innovative. They can help form the " fuller vision" of 
medical morality which may once again call for and sustain the reform 
of medicine . · 
The Pythagoreans began with their own convictions about human 
flourishing. But one of these convictions concerned the moral signifi-
cance of the crafts, the arts, the tekne. s The Pythagoreans honored 
the arts, especially music and medicine, as having moral and indeed 
ontological significance. Therefore, they did not simply appl; Pythag~ 
orean premises t.o morally neutral medical skills; instead, they tried to 
educe and elucidate the moral significance of the craft the art the 
tekne of medicine itself. Because this Pythagorean attitude to' the 
Craf~s came to be dominant in late philosophical schools, notably the 
to understand and communicate the intrinsic good of human persons 
and of some human relationships and activities has been largely aban-
doned. Attempts to articulate communities' or traditions' address to 
those ancient questions may be tolerated if the " good" is kept to 
themselves, relegated resolutely to a " private" arena and, thus, trivial-
ized. It may not even be tolerated if the "good" is announced as 
PyStoics,
9 the Pythagorean reform of medicine flourished while 
, · thagorean philosophy waned. 
In striking an intriguing contrast to most contemporary literature 
~~ medical ethics, which so often picks an ethical theory (whether 
bIll's o~ Rawls 's _o~ Nozick 's or . .. ) and applies to to dilemmas faced 
Y medical practitiOners, the Pythagorean conviction about the crafts 
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allowed and required one to identify the good implicit in the craft ; ,d 
to articulate the standards coherent with the good of the cr 't. 
According to the oath, then, the doctor is obligated not because h is 
a Pythagorean, but because he is a doctor, and his obligations co n st 
not only of standards based on Pythagorean doctrine but also of s1 n-
dards implicit in medicine. 
The oath treats medicine as a craft, an art, a tekne, or t o se · 
Alasdair Macintyre 's term, 10 as a practice, not simply as a se1 of 
technical skills. That is to say, it treats medicine as a form of h lll an 
activity with goods internal to it and standards of excellence imp cit 
in it, not simply as an assortment of skills which can be made to s( ·ve 
extrinsic goods with merely technological excellence. 
Oath Identifies Medicine's Goal 
The goal of medicine, the good which is intrinsic to the practi• ~ . is 
identified by the oath as " the benefit of the sick ." To benefit the ;ick • 
is not simply the motive for taking up certain ethically neutral ~- <ills 
nor merely an extrinsic end to be accomplished by ethically ne tral ' 
technical means . 11 It is, rather, the goal of medicine as a practice . and 
so it governed the physician 's use of his skills in diet, drugs, and 
surgery, and the use of his privileged access to the patient 's hom( and 
privacy. This intrinsic good entailed standards of professional e ~ cel­
lence which could not be reduced to technological excellence 
The pattern is repeated again and again in the oath. Its prohibi; ions 
of active euthanasia, of assisting in suicide, and of abortio n , for 
example, were not argued on the basis of Pythagorean premises; t ?ey , 
were given as standards of a practice whose goal is to benefit the s1ck. 
Because the ends intrinsic to medicine are to heal the sick, to pro tect 
and nurture health , to maintain and restore physical well-being, li m its , 
could be imposed on the use of skills within the practice. The skills 
were not to be used to serve alien ends, and the destruction of I 
human life - either the last of it or the first of it - was seen as an 
alien and conflicting end. The point was not that one would fail t o be 
a good Pythagorean if one violated these standards, although that is . 
true enough, but rather that one would fail to be a good m ed ical 
practitioner . The good physician is not a mere technician ; he is com-
mitted by the practice of medicine to certain goods and to certain 1 
standards. 
The notoriously difficult foreswearing of surgery, even on t hose 
who stand to benefit from it, is also founded on the notion of medi-
cine as a practice. Edelstein is probably right in tracing this stipu lat ion 
to the Pythagorean preference for dietetics and pharmacology as 
modes of treatment,l2 but the foreswearing in the oath did not appeal 
to any uncompromising Pythagorean position about either the appeti-
tive and dietetic causes of illness or the defilement of shedding blo od. 
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U rather articulated a standard for medical practice whose goal is to 
benefit the sick: namely, don 't attempt what lies beyond your compe-
tence. To benefit the sick was not merely a motive, but the good 
intrinsic to medicine, and to put the patient at risk needlessly- even 
with the best of intentions- can be seen to violate medicine under-
stood as such a practice. There was, therefore, no universal prohibition 
of surgery, only the particular prohibition of surgery by those ill-
equipped to attempt it. That standard may well have been of particu-
lar relevance to Pythagorean physicians, but one need not have been a 
Pythagorean to accept its wisdom as a standard of practice. 
The stipulations concerning decorum are yet another example. 
They can be readily understood against the background of Pythag-
orean asceticism and the proverbial " Pythagorean silence " 13 but 
again, the oath presented them not as Pythagorean stipulatio~s, but a~ 
s~andards of medicine understood as a practice. The goal of the prac-
tice, "the benefit of the sick, " was repeated in this context even as the 
(necessary) intrusion into the privacy, the homes, of the sick was 
acknowledged. The physician 's access to the intimacies of the patient's 
body and household and his exposure to the vulnerability of the 
patient and his household were granted and accepted for the sake of 
the goal intrinsic to medicine. To use such access for any other end or 
to make public the vulnerability to which the physician was made 
privy was seen to subvert the relation of such access and such expo-
sure to the end of medicine. It debased the patient who should be 
benefitted. It vitiated medicine as a practice and, therefore, the stan-
dards prohibiting sexual relations with patients and prohibiting 
breaches of confidentiality were implicit in medicine as a practice. 
These standards could be further explicated 14 and if the point of 
t?is essay were to treat the oath as a cod~ , th~n the further explica-
tiOn would be necessary. But that is not the point. It is not my claim 
that the oath provides an unexceptionable code of conduct. The stan-
dards of a practice at any particular time are not immune from criti-
cism. The point is to call attention to this feature of the oath 's method 
that it construes medicine as a practice. It does not provide a timeles~ 
code for medicine, but there are standards of excellence appropriate 
to and partly definitive of the practice, whose authority must be 
acknowledged, and there is a good intrinsic to the practice which must 
be appreciated and allowed to govern the skills and to form and 
~form the standards. The lesson, I suggest, for the contemporary 
discussions of medical ethics, is that those who seek the constant 
~eform of medicine should also construe medicine as a practice with 
· lln.plicit goods and standards. 
That is a hard but important lesson in a culture as bullish on tech-
nology and as pluralistic in values as our own. There is a constant 
tendency to reduce medicine to a mere - but awesome - collection of 
techniques that may be made to serve extrinsic goods, t hemselves 
May,l984 145 
often reduced to matters of taste. 
The technology of abortion is a telling example. In Roe u. Wac ~ . 
the Court declared that a woman 's decision with respect to abort i n 
was a private matter between herself and her physician. It recogni'i d 
that the moral status of the fetus was controverted, but it held t l 1t 
the fetus is not a legal person and so is not .entitled to the protecti n 
the law extends to persons. It wanted to leave the moral controve Y 
about the status of the fetus within that private arena of the decisio a 
woman and her doctor would make. The court presumed (and s g-
gested by calling the decision to abort a "medical decision") that ' te 
professional ethos of physicians would limit abortions, even if_abort: n 
were legalized, and it might have been, if there had been a v1v1d se se 
of medicine as a practice . 15 The legal license was interpreted by m r 1y 
(both women and physicians) as a moral license and the outcome as 
been a callous and frightening disregard for fetal life and welfare. 'l 1e 
protests - usually applying some extrinsic good or extrinsic stand rd 
- have been long and loud and have sometimes exhibited call• us 
disregard for the rights of women with respect to their own bodies t 1d 
ignored the legitimate controversy about the status of the fetus. ', he 
opportunity for medicine to reassert itself as a practice, different fr· .. m 
the practice of politics of the marketplace, has almost been lost . J ut 
the lesson of the oath is that the attempt is both possible and wo1 ,h-
while. 
The notion of medicine as a practice stands in marked contrast t .J a 
good deal of the current literature concerning the professions in g,m -
eral and medicine in particular. Michael Bayles, for example, won ld 
reject the normative characteristics of the professions, incl~dmg 
medicine.lG He reduces the professions to skills learned by tram mg 
and made accessible to consumers. The professions, on this view , are 
not justified or guided by any intrins1c good but by "the values of a 
liberal society."17 Thus, there are no standards implicit in the pract 1ce 
but only "ordinary norms" to be applied in professional contexts.. . 
The problems with such a view are manifold. One is lingU1st1c. 
"Professional" and "unprofessional" continue to be used evaluat1vely 
and, moreover, with respect to excellences not merely technical. . 
The notion of applying ordinary norms to medical dilemmas 1s also 
problematic. It is naive and presumptuous to suppose th~t a moral 
philosopher or theologian can boldly put to flight a moral dilemma by 
expertly wielding a sharp principle or some heavy theory.18 And how 
shall we select the " ordinary norms" to apply? Justice is surely rele-
vant, but there is more than one theory of justice. Good ends surely 
ought to be sought in medicine, too, but shall we use St. Thomas 
Aquinas or John Stuart Mill to define a good end? The values of 
society may be important, but none of us, I trust, has forgotten the 
atrocities committed when Hitler's vision of a "third reich" was 
applied to medicine. 
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'I am much more comfortable with Bayles's "values of a liberal 
society" than with Hitler's "third reich," but I am not so much more 
confident about the practice of politics than the practice of medicine 
that I would make the professional ethic dependent upon our political 
ethic. Indeed, I wonder whether a society is truly "liberal" if it tailors 
the professions to a liberal society's (minimal) vision of the good. A 
liberal society can be guilty of trivializing ancient wisdom about 
human flourishing when it.renders the professions, including medicine, 
merely instrumental skills to satisfy consumer wants. 
Application of 'Ordinary Norms' 
Bayles's application of his "ordinary norms" to medicine leads to 
minimal moral claims and, because the minimal character of the claims 
is not acknowledged, to a truncated and distorted medical ethic. There 
is, for example, no limit to " professional services" when a profession 
is basically skills accessible to consumers: laetrile, genetic testing for 
sex determination, plastic surgery to win the Dolly Parton look-alike 
contest, all become the sphere of the professional-entrepreneur. 
Immoral clients cannot be refused on the basis of " professional 
integrity," for there is no such thing. Bayles is aware of the problem 
posed by clients who would use professional skills for ends which are 
morally questionable but which do not clearly violate the " ordinary 
norms," and he presents two options for dealing with such clients. The 
"no difference" option quite candidly leaves no room for integrity of 
any kind and renders the professional the "animated tool " of the 
· consumer. l 9 The . second option perm its the physician to refuse 
services to such clients on the basis of "moral integrity," but this 
"moral integrity " is represented as strictly personal and private rather 
than professional. 2 o 
Bayles's attempt to reduce professional norms to " ordinary norms" 
applied in a medical context, to give one more exampie, leads to a 
minimal and truncated version of the prohibition of sexual intercourse 
With patients . 2 1 The ordinary norm he provides, that sexual inter-
course requires the free consent of both parties, is itself a dangerously 
minimal account of sexual ethics. It does provide a justification for 
~he prohibition, · but it does not discount either the possibility or the 
Importance of a " proft=;ssional " justification , that the (necessary) 
access to the patient's privacy and vulnerability must be guided by and 
limited to the "good" of medicine and not be used for extrinsic ends 
. (even when they are freely chosen or consented to). 
The debate about the crafts, about the professions, is an ancient 
and an enduring one. The lesson of the oath is that we should not too 
readily accept the notion of medicine as a collection of skills acces-
sible to consumers. We should not identify our task as simply applying 
Universal and rational norms of conduct to medicine and to the quan-
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daries faced within it. 2 2 
If the tekne of medicine is construed simply in terms of its tee 1-
niques or skills, learned by training and accessible to consumers, thr 1, 
of course, it is morally neutral. Skill in pharmacology enables one o 
be a good healer or a crafty murderer. But if a tekne is more tf .n 
technique, if it has its own goal and its own virtues, then it is han '.{ 
morally neutral. Then some moral wisdom about living as a fi te 
body may exist within the practice of medicine and within thc >e 
communities and traditions which learn and teach medicine as apr c-
tice. Then medicine's fragile capacity to resist being co-apted by tn 
alien ideology, even a liberal ideology (not to mention the " th cd 
reich"), can be strengthened and nurtured. The lesson of the oat! I 
suggest, is that for some, at least, the task should be to defend · 1e 
vision of medicine as a practice while educing and elucidating 'le 
goods and standards implicit in that practice. 
The Hippocratic Oath had its origins among the Pythagoreans "' .1o 
had the courage to attempt the reform of medicine and the wisd m 
not merely to apply Pythagorean premises to medicine but to canst ue 
it as a practice. It was handed down not as legislation but as a val m-
tary rule imposing voluntary obedience. Its power to reform was ot 
coercive or simply rationally persuasive; its power to reform wa tts 
power to form character and a community which nurtured it. It lid 
not set its standards in a context of legal sanctions o:r in a context of 
impartial rationality . It set these standards in a context whtch 
expressed and evoked an identity and recognized one's dependence 
upon and indebtedness to both a community and the transcendent. To 
those features of the oath we turn next. 
The oath, like all oaths and promises, was a performative declar~­
tion rather than a descriptive one . It did not just describe reality ; Jt 
altered it. The one who swore this · oath was never the same " o ne" 
again. The one swearing this oath adopted more than a set of rules and 
skills; he or she adopted an identity. The goods and standards of 
medicine as a practice were owned as one's own and gave shape to 
integrity with one's identity. Therefore, "physician" was a descript iOn 
not only of what one knew or of what one did or of what one k new 
how to do, but of who one was. Henceforth, one examined questions 
of conduct in this role not as an impartial and rational agent, calcu-
lating utility sums, say, but as a physician. Integrity with this i?entiy 
called for the physician to exert himself on behalf of the pat1ent at 
hand, even the patient-scoundrel at hand, without calculating t he 
greatest good for the greatest number. Indeed, to allow that quest iOn , 
to bear toward the patient the kind of impartial relation which makes 
it plausible, was to lose one's identity, to forfeit one's integr~ty: . 
This featur~ of the oath calls our attention to the moral s1gmf1cance 
of "identity ." Once again the Jesson of the doctor's oath sets a differ-
ent agenda than the one contemporary medical ethics has generally 
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undertaken. Contemporary medical ethics usually adopts the perspect-
ive of impartial rationality, either in the form of utilitarianism or in 
the form of contract theory. 23 To adopt any such impartial perspec-
tive, however, requires the doctor's alienation from his own moral 
interests and loyalties qua physician, from himself and from his special 
relationship to his patient. Doctors are asked, indeed, obliged, by this 
perspective to view the project and passion of their practice as though 
they were outside objective observers. 
They are asked by this approach to disown- and for the sake of 
morality - the goods and standards they possess as their own and 
which give them their moral character as physicians. 24 
Impartial Rationality Perspective 
The perspective of impartial rationality is not to be disowned. It 
can enable conversation between people with different loyalties and 
the adjudication of conflicting interests, and it can challenge the arbi-
trary dominance of one perspective over another. To be made to pause 
occasionally and, for the sake of analysis and judgment, to view things as 
impartially as we can is not only legitimate, but also salutary. But such 
an ethic remains minimal at best, and if its minimalism is not acknowl-
edged, it can distort the moral life. Physicians - and patients ·-
cannot consistently live their moral lives like that with any integrity. 
The Hippocratic Oath calls our attention to the importance of a physi-
cian's identity, character, and integrity. Such an approach might 
recover the importance of performative rituals like swearing an initia-
tory oath, and it would surely attend not only to the ways in which 
acts effectively realize ends, but also to the ways in which acts express 
values and form character. 25 
The oath expressed and evoked an identity, but it was an identity 
Which recognized its dependence upon and indebtedness to a com-
munity and the transcendent. 
The oath bound one to a community where not only the requisite 
skills were taught, but where the requisite character and identity were 
nurtured. The doctor swore to live in fellowship (Gk.: koinosasthai) 
with his teacher, to share a common life with him. He pledged, more-
over, to teach the art to his teacher's sons, to his own sons, and to all 
who wanted to le~n not simply the skills, but also the practice. Here 
Was not an autonomous individual practitioner, utilizing his skills for 
his private good or according to his private vision of the good or as 
contracted by another to accomplish the other's "good ." The doctor 
Who swore the oath stood self-consciously in a community and in a 
tradition. He acknowledged gratefully his dependence upon this com-
rnunity and tradition, his indebtedness to his teacher, and his responsi-
bility to protect and nurture the practice of medicine. 26 
This section of the oath is often criticized. 27 It is accused of fostering 
May,1984 149 
a medical guild where obligations to colleagues take priority 0 ' r 
obligations to patients. so that medical incompetence and malpracl e 
are usually covered up and the incompetent and unscrupulous (p J-
tected by the guild) do further harm to patients . The charge i a 
serious one, and the profession's reluctance to discipline its m~mb rs 
make it cogent. The fault is not with the oath, however, but with ' te 
corruption of the oath in the absence of a commitment to medicin! as 
a practice. When there is such a commitment, it governs relations Vv th 
colleagues as well as patients, and protecting and nurturing the p1 .c-
tice - both the requisite skills and the requisite character - ena <le 
and require communal discipline. The failure of the profession t o 
discipline itself adequately may be traced not to the perspective of he 
oath but to the dismissal of the perspective of the oath. 
Today the training for . medicine has shifted to university-ba ed 
medical schools, which pride themselves on their scientific detachrr- ·nt 
from questions of value in their dispassionate pursuit of the tn th. 
Such a context can virtually sponsor the construal of medicine ; s a 
collection of skills and techniques to be used for extrinsic goods wl .ch 
are not matters of truth but matters of taste .28 Then there is no 
community of people committed to a practice and under its standa ds ; 
there is only the camaraderie of those who have undergone the s. me 
arduous routine. Then the profession lacks both a commitment .. o a 
practice which makes discipline possible and a genuine enough c >m-
munity to make discipline a nurturing as well as a punishing activity. 
The stress on community in the oath can help call our attentio •1 to 
the moral necessity of attending to the institutions, communities, and 
traditions within which the physician 's identity is nurtured . Adding 
courses in medical ethics taught by philosophers or theologians t o the 
curricula of medical schools may be important, but it is neither essen-
tial nor sufficient. Indeed, if such courses are co-opted as token evi-
dence of the moral concern of the institution, or if clinical instructors 
abdicate the responsibility for difficult decisions to "the moral 
expert," the results could be counter-productive. It is more important 
to have teachers chosen and rewarded not only for their excellent 
skills but also for their excellence in medical practice - chosen and 
rewarded not only for their ability to teach the skills, but also for the 
ability to model the practice. The philosopher or theologian may then 
have an important role as participant in- and midwife for- a con-
tinuing dialogue between such teachers and their students about the 
goods and standards implicit in medicine as a practice. In such a 
continuing dialogue there will surely be continuing conflicts, but so 
any living tradition is passed down. 
No less important than institutions where doctors are trained a~e 
institutions within which they practice and the communities withtn 
which they live, including the religious communities. That religious 
communities might nurture and sustain the identity of physicians JS, 
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af course, suggested by the doctor's oath itself. The physician 
acknowledged his dependence upon and indebtedness to not only the 
community of doctors, but also to the transcendent. 
The opening line called all the gods and goddesses as witnesses to 
this oath, and the last line puts the doctor at the mercy of divine 
justice. The invocation of the gods and their divine retribution served 
of course, to signify the solemnity of the oath and the stringency of 
the obligations. More than that , however, was accomplished by the 
oath's piety, by its recognition of our 'dependence upon and indebted-
ness to transcendent power which bears down on us and sustains us. A 
narrative is provided, a narrative which helps inform identity and helps 
sustain community, a narrative which supports and tests the practice 
of medicine. The deities named are a lineage. Apollo, the god of truth 
and light, here invoked as "Apollo Physician," is the father of 
~sclepius. Asclepius, the father of medicine and the patron of physi-
Cians and patients, had two daughters, Hygeia and Panacea, or 
"Health" and "All-heal," the goddesses of health maintenance and 
therapy. 29 It is a story of the divine origins and transmission of the 
work physicians are given and gifted to do. To undertake the work of 
a physician was to make this story one 's own story, to continue it and 
embody it among human beings. They were not tempted to "play 
God" or to deny their subordinate role, but they were supported and 
encouraged in their ministrations by this story. In serving patients in 
their practice, they continued a narrative that had its beginnings 
among the gods. They were not tempted to magic by this story,3o but 
they were enabled to acknowledge the mystery of healing, the subtle 
and profound connections of the spirit and the body. 31 
Reminder of Religious Dimensions 
This feature of the oath can remind us of the religious dimensions 
of medicine and medical morality . It is a hard but important lesson for 
an age as noisily secular as ours. The oath, I think, is an example of 
the ·moral significance of a natural piety , the importance of what 
Calvin would call a sensus divinitatis, the sense of the divine. This 
natural piety includes the sense of gratitude for the gifts of life and of 
the world, a sense of dependence upon some reliable, but dimly 
known order, a sense of some tragic fault in the midst of our world, 
and a sense of responsibility to the inscrutable power Who stands 
behind the gifts and the order and Who judges the fault. 32 One can do 
· Worse, I think, than name this other wrongly ; one could understand 
(misunderstand) this other as the " enemy" of his own work, as a 
deluding power, or one could deny or (like so much of the contem-
Porary literature) ignore this other and these senses. The oath adopted 
neither of those forms of distrust; 33 rather, it set the practicE~ of 
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medicine in the context of a natural piety, i.n the context of a sense · 
gratitude, of dependence, of tragedy, and of responsibility to the tra 
scendent. Such a natural piety can still nourish and sustain the phy 
cian's calling. Its responsiveness to the transcendent can protect t l 
physician both from the presumption of " playing God" and from t l 
reductionism of plying the trade for hire. It remains part of the ful l r 
vision of medicine. 
The triumph of the doctor 's oath may finally be attributed to t . 
triumph of a new religion in the ancient world. Christianity adopted 
as its own, finally presenting it in a Christian form , " The Oa h 
According to Hippocrates In So Far As A Christian May Swear H '' 
There were certain revisions, to be sure, but the continuity of t e 
Christian version with the ancient oath is undeniable . Both the cc 1-
tinuity and the revisions are instructive for Christian theologians a . d 
communities who take part in the current discussions of bioethics. 
First note the adoption and reiteration of the standards of 1e 
Hippoc~atic Oath. There are some minor variations in the stipulatil ns 
governing the practice- the operation clause is omitt_e~' . e\ 2n 
"unintentional" harm (negligence) is forbidden, the prohibition of 
abortion is amplified -but the similarity is the striking thing. '1 he 
claim is not that here finally we have a Christian code to be used < d 
applied to current dilemmas. The claim is rather that there is a l es~ n 
here for those Christians who would contribute to the conversat w ns 
about medical ethics. The lesson is that Christian ethics does not 
disown " natural" morality. It does not construct an ethic ex nih lo, 
out of nothing. It selects and assimilates the "natural" moral wisd . m 
around it in terms of its own truthfulness and in terms of its integrtty 
with the Christian vision. The theologians who would contribut e to 
the conversations about bioethics must fir st listen attentively and 
respectfully to " natural" moral wisdom concerning medicine. T hen 
they can spea-k responsively and responsibly about the adoption a.nd 
selection of certain standards as coherent with reason, with med icme 
construed as a practice , and with the Christian vision . 
" The Oath In So Far As A Christian May Swear It" offers a second 
lesson for theologians interested in medical ethics. Note the two . 
obvious changes. The first is that the practice and its standards were 
set in the context of a Christian identity and of the Christian sto ry. 
God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, was invoked rather t han 
Apoilo e t al. ; the physician cast himself on the mercy of His justice. 
Once again, the invocation of God and His retribution served not only 
to signal the solemnity of the oath and the stringency of the obliga-
tions, but also to set the physician 's identity and practice in the con-
text of a story which has its beginnings with God. This feature was 
expressed visil?ly as well. " The Oath In So Far As A Christian May 
Swear It" - or at least some copies of it - was written in the shape of 
. . 's 
a cross. 34 The one who swore such an oath adopted the phys1c1an 
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identity as a follower of Christ, "Who took our infirmities and bore 
our diseases" (Matt. 8:17; cf. Is. 53:4). A Christian identity nurtured, 
sustained, and shaped the physician's identity for those who took such 
an oath seriously . 
The second obvious change is the reduction of duties to one 's 
teacher. Historically, this change is understandable. Medical instruc-
tion had shifted from artisan families and guilds to universities and 
eventually to faculties of medicine . 1'he Church itself was, for cen-
turies, the nurturing and sustaining institution and community for 
medicine. It chartered and administered the universities; it dominated 
the curriculum; its pervasive ethos ruled the professions. 3 5 Morally, 
the change was required by setting the oath in the context of the 
Christian story, for that story makes service the mark of greatness as 
well as of grat itude . So, it was inevitable that service to the patient 
was emphasized rather than obligations to teachers. The Christian 
story of breaking down the barriers that separate people, moreover, 
made it inevitable that the emphasis shifted from professional elitism 
to open access to this community of service. 
What Is the Lesson Here? 
The lesson here is not that we should attempt to reintroduce 
"Christendom" or even the patterns of medical instruction of that 
time. Notwithstanding the impossibility of such an attempt, the 
dominion of the Church was marked by parochialism as well as 
majesty, by pett.iness as well as grandeur, by obscurantism as well as 
learning. The reformist intention does not lead back to Christendom 
for either medicine or the Church . There is little hope for a Christian 
medical ethic that proceeds by way of a theological triumphalism, that 
claims to have truth, if not captive, at least cornered. The lesson is 
rather that Christian medical ethics cannot proceed with integrity if it 
always restricts itself to articulating and defending standards of the 
practice or certain applications of impartial principles of philosophy 
or law to medical dilemmas. It is lamentable that so little of the work 
in medical ethics by Christian theologians candidly and explicitly 
attends to the Christian story and its bearing on medicine . 36 It is 
lamentable for the communities of faith out of which these ethicists 
Work, for they want to live in faith, to live in integrity with the 
identity they have been given and to which they are called . But it is 
. also lamentable for the broader community, for a pluralistic society 
Profits from the candid expression of different perspectives. Candid 
attention to the theological dimensions of morality could prevent the 
reduction and distortion of morality to a set of minimal expectations 
necessary for pluralism and remind all participants in such a culture of 
broader and more profound questions about what human persons are 
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meant to be and to become. The integrity to think about and t1 k 
about the relevance of the Christian story is the second lesson of "1 e 
Oath In So Far As A Christian May Swear It." 
The first lesson of " The Oath In So Far As A Christian May Sw• u 
It" was that Christian ethics does not disown "natural" morality . 1 te 
Christian story does not force those who own it to disown eitl er · 
medicine as . a practice or human rationality. The second lesson Jf 
"The Oath In So Far As A Christian May Swear It" is that Christi; 1s 
concerned with medical ethics should have the integrity to set m( li-
cine in the context of the Christian story, to form, inform , and refo m 
medicine. The first lesson stands against any premature sectar :1n 
stance, against opting prematurely for either a sectarian communit~ or 
a sectarian medicine.37 The second lesson stands against any sim Jle 
identification of a Christian ethic either with universal and ratic tal 
principles or with a professional ethic, against, for example, sanct ·y-
ingcontract theory by identifying it with "covenant." 38 The task i! to 
transform or, to put it less presumptuously, to qualify39 a ratic 1al 
ethic and a professional ethic by candid attention to the Christ an 
story. 
There will be tensions, of course. With respect to decisions ab .ut 
the refusal of treatment, for example, a universal and rational e1 '1ic 
may emphasize the patient's autonomy, but a professional ethic n ay 
emphasize the physician's commitment to the life and· health of h i. or 
her patient, and a theological ethic may emphasize disposit iJns 
formed and informed by a story where the victory over death :s a 
divine victory, not a technological victory, where people need not 
stand in dread of death, but may not practice hospitality toward 
it. 40 These tensions and their resolution will require the careful at ten· 
tion of those who make it their task to think about medicine and who 
care about the Christian story as the story of our life, our whole life. 
Finally, it may be observed that theological reflection, even when it 
is presumptuous enough to talk about . " transformation," does not 
represent an alien imposition upon the practice of medicine . As we 
have seen, the tradition of medicine as a practice is at home in p iety . 
Loyalty to God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, fulfill s and · 
redeems natural piety. The native senses of gratitude and dependence, 
of a tragic fault in the midst of our world, and of responsibility , are 
not disowned by a theol~gical approach, but informed and reformed 
by the Christian story. The current literature on bioethics stands at 
risk of ignoring that story, of neglecting those resources. Chris t ians 
have a vocation to identify and articulate the significance of the Chris-
tian story for medicine not only because that agenda stands com-
fortably in an ancient tradition, but also because it will serve both 
integrity within the Christian community and humanity with med ical 
practice. To renege on this opportunity and vocation will diminish not 
only the communities of faith, but the art of medicine as well. 
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